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How Well Does the Australian Aged Pension
Provide Social Insurance?
Abstract
Social security plays an essential role in an economy, but if designed incorrectly can distort the
labor supply and savings behavior of individuals in the economy. We explore how well the
Australian means-tested pension system provides social insurance by calculating possible 
welfare gains from changing the settings in the current means-tested pension system. This work 
has been explored by other researchers both in Australia and in other pension-providing
economies. However, most research ignores the fact that welfare gains can be found by reducing
the cost of the program. To exclude these welfare costs, this paper fixes the cost of the system. 
We find that the means-tested pension system is welfare reducing, but does provide a better
outcome than an equivalent-costing PAYG system. We also find that if the benefit amount is
held constant, and hence the cost of the pension program is allowed to vary, a taper rate of 1.0 is
optimal. However, once we fix this cost, a universal benefit scheme provides the best welfare 
outcome.
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1 Introduction 
Social insurance plays an important role in the Australian economy, providing a form of insurance 
to people against risks such as illness, disability and longevity. In the 2014-15 financial year ex­
penditure on social security and welfare is expected to account for over 30% of total government 
expenditure, with assistance for the aged a key driver of expenditure growth.1 Growth in expen­
diture on aged pension is a common theme across many countries, including the U.S., U.K. and 
Europe. For this reason, the provision of aged pension is a topic of much debate, with government 
policy experts and economists looking to reform current policies to ensure optimal provision of 
benefits to elderly individuals in society. 
The Pay As You Go (PAYG) system and the means-tested system are two pension programmes 
analysed in the literature. PAYG is an intergenerational risk sharing system for social insurance 
whereby agents pay a specific social insurance tax and are provided with a benefit in times of 
retirement proportional to their average earnings. In times of a growing population and economic 
growth, this system works well as the new generation is funding the retired generation. But where 
an economy has an ageing population, with fewer working people funding more retirees, funding a 
PAYG system starts to become problematic and raises the question of efficient benefit allocation. 
Due to the funding problem a PAYG system faces, means-tested pension systems have been the 
focus of many recent studies as this type of system reduces the fiscal burden through benefit target­
ing. This benefit targeting is achieved by providing payments to aged citizens based on their income 
and savings. The means-tested system is currently employed in many countries, including Australia. 
The focus of our research is to explore how changes to the Australian means-tested pension 
system can provide welfare gains, using an open economy overlapping generations model. We first 
compare the current system and a stylised PAYG system against an economy where no pension 
system is in place, focusing on welfare gains and distributional effects. We then explore how changes 
to the current means-tested pension settings impact the labour supply and savings behaviour of 
individuals. 
Possible welfare gains resulting from adjustments to social security systems have been explored 
quite extensively. In the U.S. context, where a PAYG system is in place, Auerbach & Kotlikoff 
(1987) find that the PAYG system significantly reduces welfare. However, their paper does not 
take into account sources of uncertainty, which underlie the theory for government funded social 
insurance. Huggett & Ventura (1999) and Imrohoroglu et. al (1995) extend on Auerbach and 
Kotlikoff’s work by including life-span uncertainty and wage rate uncertainty. The results from 
their work indicate that, in the presence of incomplete annuity markets, the U.S. PAYG system 
can provide insurance benefits against longevity risk and income fluctuations. 
Huggett & Parra (2010) take a different approach to assessing the U.S. social security system. 
They first find the maximum welfare gains possible and then see how close the PAYG system and 
variations of this system come to reaching the maximum welfare level. Their results are similar to 
those found by Huggett & Ventura (1999) and Imrohoroglu et. al (1995), in that whilst the PAYG 
1This includes the following categories: Income support for seniors (age pension ), Residential and flexible care, 
Veterans’ community care and support, Home support, Home care, National partnership payments - assistance to the 
aged, Mature age income support, Allowances - concessions and services for seniors, Ageing and service improvement, 
Workforce and quality, Access and information, and Other. 
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system doesn’t achieve the maximum welfare gains possible, it does provide significant welfare gains.
 
In recent years there has been a large amount of emerging literature on means-tested social 
insurance systems. Sefton & van de Ven (2009) explored the U..K system with a means-tested 
framework and found that means-tested benefits are strictly preferred to a universal benefit struc­
ture. However, they also found that the means-tested system provides a disincentive for richer 
households to save but encouraged savings in poorer households. Kumru & Piggott (2009) ex­
tended this work further by incorporating a second tier of the U.K. system, which represents a 
PAYG system, and explore optimal taper rates. They also find that a means-tested system is 
preferred to a universal pension system, and further, that a 100% income taper rate provides the 
highest level of welfare gains. 
In the Australian context, Kudrna & Woodland (2011) explore the impacts of different income 
taper rates on the savings and work behaviour of Australians and find, similar to Sefton & van de 
Ven’s (2009) results, that the current system provides a disincentive for older middle and higher 
income Australians to work. Tran & Woodland (2014) extend on this work by exploring both 
changes to income taper rates and benefit payment rates. They find that, conditional on compul­
sory pension systems, when the maximum pension benefit is relatively low, an increase in the taper 
rate will always lead to a welfare gain. However, when maximum pension benefits are relatively 
more generous an increase in the benefit and taper rate will lead to welfare declines. 
This paper builds on previous work, notably Kumru & Piggott (2009), by adjusting both income 
taper rates and benefit payments simultaneously to fix the present value cost of the pension benefit 
system. This allows us to exclude welfare gains due solely to reduction in the cost of the system, 
and focus on identifying welfare gains due to reallocation between individuals. 
We find that, similar to Auerbach & Kotlikoff (1987) and Tran & Woodland (2014), the means-
tested system is welfare reducing. However, it provides higher welfare outcomes when compared 
to a PAYG style system. Significant differences in savings behaviour can be seen between poor 
and wealthy households under each system, with means-tested providing a disincentive for wealthy 
households to save. We also find that, similar to findings by Trans & Woodland, the largest wel­
fare gains within the means-tested system can be made with a taper rate of 1.0 as the insurance 
incentive offsets the distortionary effects on savings. However, when we fix the cost of the system 
a universal benefit scheme provides the optimal outcome. This implies that when the cost of the 
system is allowed to vary, welfare gains are due to a lower costing system. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the model that will be used in the anal­
ysis. Section 3 discusses the parameterization of the model to the Australian economy. Results 
are presented in section 4 with a sensitivity analysis presented in section 5, and section 6 concludes. 
This section provides detail on the model used to analyse changes to the Australian pension pro-
gramme. We use a simple partial equilibrium economy comprised of heterogeneous households, a 
production sector and a government sector. 
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2 The Model 
µj−1vj
µj = for j = 2, 3, 4, ...J 
1 + n 
1−ρc (1 − l)1−ϕ 
u(c, 1 − l) = + κ
1 − ρ 1 − ϕ 
2.1 Demographics and Endowments
 
Our model economy is populated by overlapping generations who live up to a maximum of J peri­
ods, with conditional probability of surviving from age j to j + 1 denoted by vj . Every period t a 
new generation is born with the population growing at an exogenous rate n. 2 There are constant 
cohort shares due to the constant growth rate and stationary demographics, which are defined as: 
(1) J
j=1 µj = 1 with
Individuals face exogenous age-efficiency profiles, Ej , which represent changes to ability over 
time and are the same for all individuals. The productivity of an individual at a particular time 
period depends on not only on their age j, but they are also faced with idiosyncratic wage rate 
shocks sj . 
2.2 Preferences 
In our model all individuals have identical preferences over consumption and leisure, which is de­
noted by the expected utility function with discount factor β as follows: 
⎡ ⎤ 
J � j �  ⎦E ⎣ βj vi u(cj , 1 − lj ) 
j=1 i=1 
(2) 
Each period individuals are endowed with 1 unit of labour, and they choose the amount of 
labour and leisure in that period, given by lj and 1 − lj respectively. Instantaneous utility is ob­
tained through consumption and leisure, and defined as: 
(3)
The coefficient of relative risk aversion is given by ρ ∈ (0, +∞) with the the inter-temporal 
elasticity of substitution of consumption given by 1 ρ . The Frisch elasticity of leisure is given by −ϕ 1 , 
with ϕ ∈ (0, +∞). κ captures the dislike for work relative to enjoyment of consumption. 
2.3 Production sector 
The production sector consists of many perfectly competitive large firms, which is equivalent to 
one large firm that maximises profits. The representative firm produces output Y at time t using 
effective labour services L and capital K with exogenously given technology level A. The technology 
is represented by a Cobb-Douglas constant returns to scale production function: 
L1−αYt = AtKα t t (4)
2The time notation is excluded from the rest of the model description for simplicity. 
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The firm chooses capital and labour to maximise its profits, which can be expressed as:
 
maxK,L{AKαL1−α − rK − wL} (5) 
2.4 Government sector 
The government runs a pension programme and makes consumption expenditure. This section 
outlines the two pension programmes used in this model, as well as the taxation on consumption 
and income. 
Taxation 
The government collects tax on both income and consumption to finance its general expenditure 
and age pension. The consumption tax is set at rate τ c . Australia’s income taxation system is 
progressive, whereby individuals in higher income bands are taxed more than those in lower income 
bands. It can be expressed as: 
T (yj ) = Tk + τk(yj − ¯ yj ∈ [ ¯ yk ¯  +1] yk), yk, (6)
where τk is the marginal tax rate, Tk is the flat tax and y¯k is the income threshold for the 
income bucket k. In the Australian context we have T1 = 0, τ1 = 0 and Tk yk −= Tk−1 + τk( ¯ yk ¯−1). 
Means-tested pension 
In the Australian benchmark model, the government runs a means-tested pension system. The 
benefit amount b(yj , aj ) is subject to two tests, an income test and an asset test, and can be written 
as: 
bm(yj , aj ) = min{by(yj ), ba(aj )} (7) 
where by(yj ) is the income test pension and b
a(aj ) is the asset test pension. So an individual 
receives the minimum of the two tests. Each test is subject to a threshold amount and is given by: 
by(yj ) = 
⎧ ⎪⎪⎪⎨ ⎪⎪⎪⎩ 
bmax if yj ≤ y¯1 
bmax − ty(yj − y¯1) if y¯2 < yj < y¯2 
0 if yj ≥ y¯2 (8)
 
y1 + b
max/tyy¯2 = ¯where y¯1 and are the income thresholds and ty is the taper rate for income, 
which is the rate at which the benefit is reduced for each dollar over y¯1. 
⎧ ⎪⎪⎪⎨ ⎪⎪⎪⎩ 
bmax if aj ≤ a¯1 
bmax − ta(aj − a¯1) if a¯2 < aj < a¯2ba(aj ) = 0 if aj ≥ a¯2 (9)

5 
a1 + b
max/ta a¯2 = ¯where a¯1 and are the asset thresholds and ta is the taper rate for assets, 
which is the rate at which the benefit is reduced for each dollar over a¯1. 
Pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension 
The PAYG pension system collects a specific social security tax from workers during their work 
life, and then provides a payment that is proportional to the individuals average earnings. In this 
system, the social security tax rate is denoted τss and the tax collected through the social security 
tax can be expressed as: 
T s = minj 
⎧ ⎪⎨ ⎪⎩ 
τsslj Ej sj w 
emax (10) 
where emax is the maximum taxable level. 
       
 xsThe benefit provided to retirees is denoted bs(xs) where is an accounting variable, i.e. equally 
weighted earnings before retirement. 
2.5 An Individual’s Decision Problem 
Individuals are heterogeneous with respect to state variables of age, working ability and asset hold­
ings. An individual’s state variables at age j are denoted by xj = (ej , aj ). Individuals realise their 
state xj and choose the optimal consumption cj , leisure time 1 − lj (or working time lj) and end 
of period asset holdings aj+1 given wage and interest rates, government tax and pension policies, 
survival probabilities, and their working ability. 
Individuals have three sources of income; returns from savings raj , effective labour earnings 
lj Ej sj w, and possible pension payment bj . Therefore their income can be expressed as: 
yj = 
⎧ ⎪⎨ ⎪⎩ 
raj + lj Ej sj w if j < j∗ 
raj + bj (x) if j ≥ j∗ 
From this we can express an individual’s growth-adjusted budget constraint as:
 
⎧ ⎪⎨ cj + (1 + g)aj+1 ≤ (1 + r)aj + (1 − τs − τp)lj Ej sj w − τ(yi) when j < j∗ ⎫ ⎪⎬ ⎪⎩ cj + (1 + g)aj+1 ≤ (1 + r)aj + bj + b' j (x) − τ (yi) when j ≥ j∗ cj ≤ (1 + r)aj + bj (x) + b' j (x) − τ (yi) when j = J ⎪⎭ (11)
 
and we assume that individuals cannot borrow against future income: 
aj ≥ 0, ∀j (12) 
6 
  
 
 
 
 
J 
K = µj aj (x)dΛj 
Xj=1 
J  
L = µj lj (x)dΛj 
Xj=1 
J  
C = µj cj (x)dΛj 
Xj=1 
Hence, an individual’s decision problem in our model can be written as the dynamic program­
ming problem below, where Vj is the value function of the individual at age j and x
' is the next 
period state vector. 
Vj (x) = max {u(cj , lj ) + βvj+1EVj+1(x ')} 
cj ,lj 
(13) 
subject to equations 11 and 12. 
2.6 Equilibrium 
Our equilibrium definition follows Auerbach & Kotlikoff (1987), Imrohoroglu et. al (1995), and 
Kumru & Piggott (2009). 
Given government policy settings for taxation and the pension system, the constant population 
growth rate, and exogenous interest rate, a stationary equilibrium is such that: 
1.	 a collection of individuals’ decisions {cj (·), lj (·), aj+1(·)}Jj=1 solve the individual decision prob­
lem (13) subject to constraints (11) and (12) 
2. age dependent distributions of individuals are calculated as: 
 
Λj+1(x) = (sj+1, sj ) dΛj 
s X  
(sj+1, sj ) where is the transition matrix for the shocks. Λ1(x) is given. 
3. the firm chooses labour and capital inputs to solve the maximisation problem (5) 
4. the lump-sum bequest transfer (Ω) is equal to the sum of accidental bequests: 
J  
Ω = µj (1 − vj+1(z))aj (x)dΛj 
Xj=1 
5. aggregate capital (K), labour (L) and consumption (C) is derived from individuals’ behaviour  
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J j∗−1 
µj b
m(x)dΛj = τ 
m µj yj (x)dΛj 
X Xj=j∗ j=1 
J j∗−1
 
bss(x)dΛj = τ
ss
 µj µj min{yj (x), ymax}dΛj 
X Xj=j∗ j=1 
3 Calibration 
6. age pension programmes are self-financing: 
7. the Government budget constraint is satisfied at every period:
 
T inc +Ω+ τcC+ = G
 
8. goods market clears:
 
C + (1 + g)(1 + n)K + G = Y + (1 − δ)K
 
This section details the parameters used in our model. We calibrate the benchmark model to the 
Australian economy. The key parameters are detailed in Table 1. 
Table 1: Parameters 
Parameters Model Observation / Comment / Source 
Demographics 
Initial age j = 1 Age 21 
Maximum age j = 65 Age 85 
Retirement age j∗ = 55 Age 65 
Annual Population Growth n = 0.012 ABS data 
Survival probabilities 
Age efficiency profile 
vj 
Ej 
ABS data 
HILDA data 
Preferences 
Annual discount factor β = 0.99 Match Australian saving behaviour 
Risk adversion parameter ρ = 2 Tran & Woodland (2011) 
Frisch elasticity γ = 0.35 Buddelmeyer et. al (2007) 
Production 
Capital share of GDP α = 0.4 Tran & Woodland (2014) 
Interest rate r = 0.0495 Average10 year Treasury bond 
Government 
Government consumption 
Consumption tax 
G = 0.14 
τ c 
Tran & Woodland (2014) 
Endogenously determined 
Income taxes 
Means-tested pension 
PAYG pension 
τj , Tj , y¯j 
bmax, ty, ta, y¯1, a¯1 
2014-15 tax schedules 
2014-15 pension rules 
Huggett & Parra (2010) 
Demographics 
Our model assumes individuals are born, or become economically active, at age 21 (j = 1) and 
live up to a maximum age of 85 (j = 65). The population growth rate is set to 1.2% which is the 
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Australian average over the last 10 years. The conditional survival probabilities (vj ) of individuals 
are estimated using ABS data on death rates. 
The age efficiency profiles (Ej ) correspond to hourly wage rates by age. We have estimated the 
Australian age efficiency profile using the data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics 
in Australia (HILDA) survey3, similar to Tran & Woodland (2014). 
We estimate the idiosyncratic wage rate shocks using a five-point discrete Markov chain process 
as described by Tauchen & Hussey (1991). Similar to Cho & Sane (2011) we use the Gini coefficient 
as a measure of the variance, which is 0.34 taken from Greenville et. al. (2013). The shocks are 
calculated as sk = {0.2069, 0.4133, 0.7721, 1.4424, 2.8819} and the probabilities for each shock are 
calculated as pk = {0.0988, 0.2418, 0.3188, 0.2418, 0.0988} 
Preferences 
We set ρ = 2 which is a standard assumption for Australia. We then set κ = 1 to normalise to 
unity. We calibrate ϕ to match the Frisch elasticity of γ = 0.35. We use β = 0.99 to match the 
Australian savings behaviour, which is also used by Tran & Woodland (2014). 
Production sector 
We use the capital share of GDP α = 0.4 as calculated in Tran & Woodland (2014). As Australia 
is a small economy, we use a partial equilibrium model where factor prices are set exogenously. We 
set the interest rate r = 0.0495 which is the average of Australian Treasury bonds over the last 10 
years. 
Government sector 
Figure 1: Marginal Tax Rates 
The consumption tax rate adjusted endogenously within the model to ensure the government 
budget is balanced. We use a quadratic function to approximate the marginal tax rates individuals 
3HILDA is a longitudinal household survey that collects data on income, work, and family / household formation. 
Similar to Tran & Woodland (2011) we use data from the first 7 waves of the survey for our age efficiency profiles. 
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face, similar to that used by Kumru & Piggott (2009) and Huggett & Parra (2010). The actual 
marginal tax rates versus the estimated marginal tax rates are shown in Figure 1, which verifies 
that the quadratic function matches real marginal tax rates fairly closely. 
We use the means-tested pension rates as detailed by the Department of Human Services for 
2014-15. This includes a taper rate on income of ty = 0.5, a benefit reduction rate on assets of 
ta = 0.0015, an income threshold of y¯1 = $4, 160 per year, an asset threshold of a¯1 = $348, 500 and 
a benefit payment of $14, 846 per year. As our model does not adequately capture homeownership, 
we use the asset threshold for individuals who do not have a family home. 
To compare the Australian means-tested pension system to a PAYG system, we use Huggett 
& Parra (2010) benefit payment parameters for the PAYG system. This is expressed as a benefit 
payment function in Figure 2. We set the social security tax such that the net present value of the 
system matches the benchmark Australian means-tested system, in this case τss = 21.8%. 
Figure 2: PAYG Benefit Function 
4 Simulation Results 
This section first compares our benchmark model to the current Australian economy before explor­
ing different policy changes. When discussing policy changes we focus on comparing means-tested 
pension system and PAYG pension systems before considering changes to taper rates and pension 
payment rates, holding the cost of the programme constant. 
4.1 Benchmark Model 
Before considering changes to the Australian means-tested pension system, we first examine key 
outputs of our model to see that it matches features of the Australian economy. 
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Asset profile4 
In order to compare our model output to real Australian data, we use the HILDA survey results 
on assets and wealth distribution. As can be seen in Figure 3, our model generates the same life-
cycle asset accumulation whereby individuals accumulate assets early in their life before drawing 
down on them during retirement. We can see that assets are lower earlier in life, starting at 0 when 
j = 1, as we constrain our model such that individuals start their working life with no assets. We 
can also see that peak savings, while at the same stage of life in both sets of data, is much higher 
in the real data compared to our model output. Housing is often cited as a key incentive for saving 
in the Australian context, and while excluded from the data there may be flow on to other savings 
behaviour. So this difference in peak savings may be attributed to the fact that our model doesn’t 
include housing. 
Figure 3: Asset Profile 
Labour market 
Our model matches the life cycle labour supply behaviour of individuals fairly well, as shown 
in Figure 4. A notable difference being that younger individuals work more than the observed data 
shows. This is primarily due to the assumption in our model that individuals enter their working 
life with no assets and cannot borrow. We also make the retirement decision exogenous in our 
modeling, meaning that individuals leave the workforce at 65. 
4.2 Comparison of Pension Systems 
In this section we compare the benchmark model and a stylised PAYG pension system with the 
Australian economy without a pension system in place. We focus on welfare differences and explore 
4Assets in our model do not include compulsory superannuation or housing 
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∗ V (x0 )EV = ∗ − 1V (x )
1 
  1/(1−ρ)
,
Figure 4: Labour Profile
 
changes in savings and labour supply behaviour. 
A pension system has two opposing impacts on individuals behaviour; it provides a form of 
risk-sharing but also distorts individuals labour supply and savings behaviour. We use the results 
in Table 2 to assess which of these is the dominant force in the PAYG pension system, means-tested 
pension system and an economy without a pension system. 
To compare the models in terms of welfare we compute the consumption equivalent varia­
tion (CEV), which is a standard method following on from Conesa et. al (2009) and Kumru & 
Thanopoulos (2011)5 . We use the model with no pension as the baseline for analysis in this section, 
meaning a positive CEV indicates a welfare gain compared to the model with no pension and a 
negative CEV indicates a welfare loss compared to the model with no pension. We also use the 
model with no pension as the baseline model for comparing relative changes in savings and labour 
supply. 
Table 2: Results from Comparison of Pension Systems 
System Cost of Pension System CEV (%) Aggregate Labour Aggregate Savings 
No pension NA 0 100 100 
PAYG -1.54 -23 117.2 60.1 
Means-tested -1.54 -22 116.5 61.1 
As shown in Table 2, both pension systems are welfare reducing. Individuals in both the means­
5As described in Kumru & Thanpoulos (2011) C  where x ∗ 0 is the benchmark model 
allocation and x ∗1
 is the new system allocation 
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tested and PAYG system have much lower savings over their life-span than under the model with no 
pension system. This aligns with the results from Tran & Woodland (2014), Auerbach & Kotlikoff 
(1987), and Imrohoroglu et. al (1995), which consistently find that pension systems are welfare 
reducing due to the dominant effect of incentive distortion. Figure 5 shows this distortion clearly 
through the savings behaviour of individuals under each of the systems. 
Figure 5: Average Asset Profiles 
Now we take a closer look at the differences between the two pension systems. As can be seen 
from Table 2, a PAYG system has a lower CEV (-23%) when compared to a means-tested system 
(-22%). This provides an additional layer of analysis to show that the averse incentive effects are 
marginally smaller under the means-tested system compared with the PAYG system. To fully un­
derstand the differences between the two systems, we compare the different impacts on the poor 
and wealthy in the economy. 
Let us first consider the lowest earners in the system, and examine their savings and labour 
supply behaviour. As can be seen by Figure 6, lowest earners do not change their savings or labour 
supply behaviour between the two systems. This is because they have no incentive to lower savings 
under a means-tested system, given they are already receiving the largest benefit. In the case 
of a PAYG system, they cannot increase their labour supply sufficiently to increase their benefit 
payment in retirement, hence they have lower utility under a PAYG system. 
We can see in Figure 7 that the highest earners accumulate assets earlier in life in a PAYG sys­
tem, reaching a much higher peak of savings than under a means-tested system. The disincentive 
to save under a means-tested system for wealthy individuals is due to the fact that their benefit in 
retirement reduces if their savings levels are too high. There is no such disincentive under a PAYG 
system, hence the higher savings and higher utility for wealthy individuals in a PAYG system. 
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Figure 6: Labour Supply and Savings Behaviour of Lowest Earners
 
Figure 7: Labour Supply and Savings Behaviour of Highest Earners
 
We conclude that while the means-tested pension system is welfare reducing, the reduction in 
welfare is lower than that under the PAYG pension system. The two systems have very different 
impacts on the savings behaviour of individuals, with the means-tested system providing a disin­
centive for wealthier individuals to save. 
4.3 Changes to Means-tested Policy 
In this section we explore changes to the income taper rate in the means-tested system. By varying 
the taper rate we are changing the effective marginal tax on income in retirement, with a higher 
taper rate increasing the effective marginal tax. Given savings are the single source of income in 
retirements, by changing the taper rate we expect to see changes to savings behaviour. We first 
explore these effects in a model with varying cost, before examining how imposing constant cost 
of the programme changes the results. In this section we use the benchmark model as the baseline 
for examining welfare gains with CEV and relative changes to savings and labour. 
Variable system cost 
We first simulate a number of alternative model economies where we vary the taper rate in the 
means-tested pension holding the income threshold, benefit payment, and asset testing constant. 
A different taper rate has two main effects; it changes the value of the benefit paid to retirees and 
simultaneously changes the number of retirees who receive benefit payments. Table 3 reports the 
welfare effects as well as the main aggregate variables we are interested in. 
The results reported in Table 3 indicate that in our model economy a taper rate of 1.0 provides 
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Table 3: Results from Changes to the Taper Rate
 
Taper Rate Maximum Benefit Cost of Pension System CEV Savings Labour 
0.0 15,000 -1.94 -7.550 92.4 98.8 
0.1 15,000 -1.85 -4.429 96.1 101.1 
0.2 15,000 -1.78 -3.027 97.7 100.7 
0.3 15,000 -1.71 -3.004 96.8 100.8 
0.4 15,000 -1.63 0.390 100.9 99.9 
0.5 15,000 -1.54 0.000 100.0 100.0 
0.6 15,000 -1.44 4.091 104.8 99.0 
0.7 15,000 -1.38 5.130 105.9 98.7 
0.8 15,000 -1.29 7.325 108.5 98.2 
0.9 15,000 -1.22 8.599 109.6 97.9 
1.0 15,000 -1.17 9.597 110.6 97.7 
the greatest welfare gain, similar to the conclusion from Kumru & Piggott (2009) and Tran & 
Woodland (2014). At this taper rate, we are maximising the risk-sharing mechanism while min­
imising the distortionary impact on savings behaviour. 
We can see the distortionary effects on savings increase as the taper rate decreases due to fact 
that individuals have a lower incentive to save for their retirement. As the taper rate decreases, 
more individuals become eligible for the pension programme, meaning they do not need to save as 
much for their retirement. Under a universal benefit (taper rate = 0.0), everyone receives a benefit 
regardless of their income, meaning even the wealthiest individuals in the economy can reduce their 
savings and still maintain their consumption in retirement. 
The impact on labour supply behaviour is much less significant, with a lower taper rate resulting 
in higher labour supply behaviour. Again, this result is due to the fact that a higher taper rate 
results in more individuals lowering their labour, and hence savings and income in retirement, to 
ensure their eligibility for the pension system. 
The results in Table 3 show that the cost of the system increases as the taper rate decreases, 
as individuals who received very little or no pension benefit now receive a higher payment. This 
means our results cannot indicate if the welfare gains due to higher taper rates are due to an opti­
mal distribution of benefits or simply due to a lower costing pension programme. To explore this 
further, we fix the cost of the programme by varying the benefit amount, and compare the changes 
in welfare and savings behaviour. 
Constant system cost 
We now simulate a number of alternative model economies where we vary the taper rate and 
benefit amount in the means-tested pension, holding the cost of the programme constant. Again 
we hold the income threshold and asset testing constant. By keeping the cost of the programme 
constant we can ensure that changes in welfare are solely attributed to the distribution of benefit 
payments in the economy and exclude any welfare changes due to a change in the cost of the pension 
system. 
The results in Table 4 show that when the cost of the system is held constant, the optimal 
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5 Sensitivity Analysis 
Table 4: Results from Changes to the Taper Rate with Constant Cost
 
Taper Rate Maximum Benefit Cost of Pension System CEV Savings Labour 
0.0 9,000 -1.54 0.697 100.6 99.8 
0.1 10,000 -1.54 0.496 100.2 99.9 
0.2 12,000 -1.54 0.483 100.1 99.9 
0.3 13,000 -1.54 0.363 100.1 99.9 
0.4 14,000 -1.54 0.183 99.8 100.0 
0.5 15,000 -1.54 0.000 100.0 100.0 
0.6 16,000 -1.54 -0.007 100.0 100.0 
0.7 17,000 -1.54 -0.096 99.9 100.1 
0.8 17,000 -1.54 -0.126 99.8 100.1 
0.9 18,000 -1.54 -0.191 99.7 100.1 
1.0 19,000 -1.54 -0.292 99.6 100.1 
taper rate is 0.0, a universal benefit scheme. This directly opposes the results from the variable 
cost system, indicating that the driver for welfare gains under a variable cost pension programme 
is lower cost, and hence lower tax on individuals. 
Under the fixed cost economies, changes in the taper rate also produce opposing results for sav­
ings and labour supply behaviour. As the taper rate and benefit payment increase, the incentive 
to lower savings increases as individuals reduce their income in retirement to become eligible for 
the pension programme. 
From this analysis, we conclude that under a system with a fixed benefit, a taper rate of 1.0 is 
preferred to all other taper rates. Lower taper rates distort the savings behaviour of individuals in 
the economy through the higher tax rate needed to fund the pension programme. However, when 
we hold the cost of the system the same, we find that a universal benefit is preferred. As the benefit 
payment is lower, the distortionay effects on savings behaviour are minimised. This is an important 
result as it highlights that the distortionary effects of changes to taper rates within a means-tested 
pension system are due to changes in tax rates on individuals. Changes to the taper rate under a 
fixed cost pension system produce the opposite affect, with a universal benefit providing the best 
welfare outcome. Again, this indicates that the results from a variable cost pension programme are 
driven by the cost of the system, rather than the distribution of benefits. 
In this section we analyse how changes to parameters in the model impacts the results. This 
provides evidence that our results are robust. We consider these changes to parameters; survival 
probabilities, age efficiencies, and risk aversion. Within our analysis we focus on our key findings 
from Section 4.3; optimal taper rates under fixed and variable cost pension systems. 
16
 
5.1 Survival Probabilities 
We consider the current Australian survival probabilities and lower survival probabilities6 as pic­
tured in Figure 8, and explore how changes to these probabilities impact our findings. 
Figure 8: Conditional Survival Probabilities 
Table 5: Survival Probabilities with Changing Taper Rates
 
Taper Rate 
Variable cost 
CEV (%) 
High survival rates 
Savings Labour CEV (%) 
Low survival rates 
Savings Labour 
0.0 -7.550 92.4 98.8 -5.286 96.0 101.5 
0.25 -1.969 98.5 100.4 -3.724 96.8 101.0 
0.5 0.000 100.0 100.0 0.000 100.0 100.0 
0.75 6.661 107.4 98.3 3.891 103.3 98.9 
1.0 9.597 110.6 97.7 7.652 106.5 97.9 
Fixed cost
 
0.0 0.697 100.6 99.8 0.866 100.4 99.8 
0.25 0.338 100.0 100.0 0.422 100.4 99.9 
0.5 0.000 100.0 100.0 0.000 100.0 100.0 
0.75 -0.083 99.8 100.1 -0.101 99.9 100.0 
1.0 -0.292 99.6 100.1 -0.258 99.9 100.1 
We can see from our results in Table 5 that survival probabilities have an impact on savings 
behaviour and welfare under a means-tested pension system. However, the results align with our 
findings in Section 4 in that a taper rate of 1.0 produces the largest welfare gain in a variable cost 
model due to lower tax rates. Under a fixed cost model we can see that a universal benefit provides 
the best welfare outcome, which aligns with our results from Section 4.3. 
6For the lower survival probabilities we use U.S. values as used by Huggett & Parra (2010) 
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5.2 Age Efficiency Profiles
 
We consider the current flat efficiency profile used in Australia and a more concave age efficiency 
profile7 shown in Figure 9. We examine if the distribution of age efficiency impact our findings, 
focusing on how larger differences in potential earnings across age groups impact welfare and savings. 
Figure 9: Age Efficiency Profile 
Table 6: Age Efficiencies with Changing Taper Rates
 
Flat distribution 
Savings 
Concave distribution. 
Savings Taper Rate CEV (%) Labour CEV (%) Labour 
Variable cost 
0.0 -7.550 92.4 98.8 -7.215 92.8 102.1 
0.25 -1.969 98.5 100.4 -3.847 95.7 101.1 
0.5 0.000 100.0 100.0 0.000 100.0 100.0 
0.75 6.661 107.4 98.3 2.140 99.9 99.5 
1.0 9.597 110.6 97.7 3.383 101.4 99.1 
Fixed cost
 
0.0 0.697 100.6 99.8 0.630 100.8 99.8 
(%) 0.25 
0.5 
0.338 
0.000 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
0.178 
0.000 
100.2 
100.0 
99.9 
100.0 
0.75 -0.083 99.8 100.1 -0.201 99.9 100.1 
1.0 -0.292 99.6 100.1 -0.525 99.8 100.2 
Table 6 results show that under a variable cost programme with a concave distribution of age 
efficiencies, a taper rate of 1.0 produces the largest welfare gain. This result aligns with our conclu­
sion in Section 4, indicating that while the distribution of age efficiencies will impact the magnitude 
of the welfare gain, it will not change the directional impact a change in the taper rate produces. 
We can also see from Table 6, that the welfare gains from changing taper rates under a variable 
cost programme with a concave distribution of age efficiencies are optimised for a universal benefit 
7For the concave age efficiency profile we use data on the U.S. as reported by Huggett & Parra (2010) 
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6 Conclusion 
under a fixed cost model. Again, this is due to the fact that the welfare gains under from increasing 
taper rates under a variable cost programme are due to lower tax, not better distribution of benefits. 
We conclude that while different age efficiency profiles do impact the size of the welfare gain 
and changes in individuals labour supply behaviour under different taper rates within a means-
tested pension system, the results are similar to those in Section 4. Our results come to the same 
conclusion as Section 4, that welfare gains under a variable cost programme are not present under 
a fixed cost model. 
5.3 Risk Aversion 
In this section we use a higher risk aversion parameter of 3 and explore whether this impacts our 
results. A higher risk aversion parameter is representative of a more risk averse economy. 
Table 7: Risk Aversion with Changing Taper Rates 
Taper Rate Benefit Cost CEV (%) Savings Labour
 
Variable cost
 
0.0 15,000 -2.07 -8.433 94.3 102.1 
0.25 15,000 -1.91 -3.982 97.4 101.0 
0.5 15,000 -1.65 0.000 100.0 100.0 
0.75 15,000 -1.38 6.445 105.1 98.65 
1.0 15,000 -1.22 15.548 111.5 96.8 
Fixed cost
 
0.0 9,000 -1.65 0.915 100.6 99.8 
0.25 12,000 -1.65 0.395 100.2 99.9 
0.5 15,000 -1.65 0.000 100.0 100.0 
0.75 16,000 -1.65 -0.154 100.0 100.0 
1.0 18,000 -1.65 -0.551 99.6 100.2 
Table 7 illustrates that in an economy with a higher risk aversion parameter, the results from 
Section 4 still hold; a taper rate of 1.0 maximises welfare under a variable cost pension system and 
a universal benefit maximises welfare under a fixed cost system. 
Pension programmes play an important role in society by providing insurance against longevity 
risk. However, these pension programmes can distort labour supply and savings behaviour of indi­
viduals, resulting in welfare losses. In this paper we explore how changes to the current Australian 
pension system impact welfare. 
The design of pension systems is a topic of many recent studies given their role in society. Our 
work builds on that by Kumru & Piggott (2009), using an overlapping-generations model to explore 
changes in savings and labour behaviour in response to changes in the means-tested taper rate. We 
also examine welfare differences between an economy with no pension system, and that with either 
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a PAYG system or means-tested system. 
Previous research has focused on changes to taper rates within the means-tested pension pro-
gramme and the resulting change in welfare. However, there has been little consideration to how 
the change in the programme cost interplays with the change in welfare. Our work extends on the 
current body of research by changing both the taper rate and benefit payment to hold the cost of 
the programme constant, and then considering the impact on welfare. 
We find, similar to Auerbach & Kotlikoff (1987) and Tran & Woodland (2011), that a means-
tested system is welfare reducing. However, a means-tested system does provide a welfare gain 
compared to a similar costing PAYG system. We also find that, similar to previous work by Kumru 
& Piggott (2009) and Tran & Woodland (2011), a taper rate of 1.0 provides the best welfare out­
come in a pension system with fixed benefit and variable cost. However, when we hold the cost of 
the programme constant, we find an opposing impact on welfare, with a universal benefit providing 
the maximum welfare. This is due to the fact that under a variable cost system lower taper rates 
result in higher costs, and these costs are financed through taxation of individuals during their 
working life which drives the welfare losses. Once the cost for the system is held constant, we see 
that lower benefits paid to all individuals provides the best welfare outcome. 
Our model assumes evenly distributed income through the wage rate shocks. Given the results 
from our sensitivity analysis on age efficiency profiles, we would suggest that exploration of varying 
shock distribution would provide an interesting extension on our work. We also consider inclusion 
of superannuation and endogenous retirement decision would be beneficial in future research. Fi­
nally, our model assumes constant population age distribution. Give that there is growing pressure 
on government financing of aged pension from an ageing population, inclusion of this phenomenon 
would provide an interesting extension to our work. 
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